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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages, declaratory relief and an 
injunction, charging approximately twenty-six counts or viola-
tions of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Utah State 
statutory rights, and violations of constitutional rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution of Utah and the United States of 
America for the emergency involuntary commitment of Mrs. Kae 
Nichols to the Duchesne County Jail and the Utah Mental Hospital 
in Provo, Utah. 
CASE NUMBER 
14428 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint, without comment, on February 5, 1975. 
Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint on 
November 24, 1975. The lower court denied plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend the Complaint. Plaintiff-Appellant appeals from that 
denial. * 
RFLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a determination by this Court 
that the ruling of the lower court in denying plaintiff leave 
to amend the Complaint constituted an abuse of discretion, was 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
?
 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 2, 1974, the Plaintiff, Kae Nichols, a 
married female, was involuntarily committed first in the Duchesne 
County Jail, then in the Utah State Hospital at Provo, Utah, 
pursuant to an application for emergency involuntary hospitali-
zation under Section 64-7-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. (R-2; letter from Garth Harrison to Wilfred Higashi 
between R-15 and R-16.) 
2. On July 12, 1974, Plaintiff filed a petition for writs 
of habeas corpus ad deliberandum et recipiendum and habeas cor-
pus ad subjiciendum (the Great Writ of Liberty) pursuant to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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U.R.C.P. Rule 65 B, Article 1, Section 9 of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. No adversary hearing was ever held. Judge Allen B. 
Sorenspn, sitting in Utah County, refused Plaintiff's attorney 
the right to make any oral argument for release of plaintiff at 
the time set for hearing. No writs of habeas corpus were is-
sued. Plaintiff was held against her will for twenty-two days 
and then released. (R-20, 35, 36, 37, 48) 
4. Plaintiff filed a complaint and petition for declara-
tory judgment against defendants, the State of Utah, et al, on 
or about August 22, 1974, in the Duchesne County District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, J. Robert Bullock, presiding. 
The ten page complaint alleged approximately twenty-six counts 
or violations of rights guaranteed the plaintiff by the statutes 
of Utah, the statutes of the United States, and the Constitu-
tions of both the State of Utah and the United States of 
America, including such issues as the right to counsel, right 
to a jury trial, right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
her, right to be informed of the basis of h^r detention, right 
to an adversary hearing, right to a female attendant, burden of 
proof, right to cross examination, right to discovery, right to 
writs of habeas corpus, improper notice, illegal change of the 
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place of hearing, violation of due process of law, unconstitu-
tional vagueness in the statute, no compelling state interest 
for commitment, indeterminate incarceration, derogation of civil 
rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, elimination of rules of 
evidence, deprivation of procedural safeguards, and unconstitu-
tional post-admission remedies. (R-l through 15) 
5. Defendants answered the complaint on September 11, 1974. 
On September 13, 1974, defendants made a motion to dismiss plain-
tiff's complaint. (R-16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 28) 
4 
6. Counsel for plaintiff withdrew temporarily from October 
31, 1974, to January 6, 1975, upon request of the County Attor-
ney for Duchesne to avoid the appearance of a conflict of inter-
est while plaintiff's counsel was a part-time deputy county 
attorney. Plaintiff filed her objection to the motion for dis-
missal on January 6, 1975. (R-33, 34, 38, 39, 21, 22, 23, 29 
through 37) ' ' • . * 
7. J. Robert Bullock, District Judge, in a memorandum rul-
ing dated February 5, 1975, granted the defendants' motion with-
out reason or comment. 
8. Plaintiff's counsel typed a Notice of Appeal, but could 
not get in contact with plaintiff, who had moved out of state, 
[-
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in time to file the Notice of Appeal within the statutory time 
limit. (R-51, 52, 53/ 56, 57, 58, 59, 60) 
9. Plaintiff's counsel made diligent efforts to contact 
plaintiff out of state for the signing of the Affidavit for ap-
peal and thereafter finally, after publishing notice in a 
foreign state newspaper, reinstated contact with the plaintiff 
approximately nine months after the motion to dismiss was grant-
ed. Plaintiff then promptly filed a motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P., on November 
24, 1975. Defendants opposed the motion for an amended com-
plaint. (R-51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 54, 55) 
10. Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, replacing Judge 
Bullock in circuit for Duchesne County, in a ruling dated Decem-
ber 19, 1975, held that the court was without jurisdiction to 
entertain the motion, which motion was denied with a comment as 
to the length of time elapsing between the dismissal of the ac-
tion on February 5, 1975, and the motion to amend filed November 
24, 1975, a period of nine months. (R-61) 
11. Plaintiff now appeals from the lower court's denial of 
leave to amend the complaint on the grounds of prejudicial abuse 
of discretion. 
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ARGUMKNT 
POINT 1. 
THF LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE MOTION 
TO AMEND. 
It is well settled that a court of general jurisdiction has 
the authority to grant leave to amend a complaint either before 
or after a motion to dismiss the complaint is allowed. As a 
general rule pleadings may, in the discretion of the court and 
in furtherance of justice, be amended at any stage of the proce-
dure. 49 Corpus Juris, Pleading, Section 605, p. 477. 
"As a rule, the court in its discretion may permit 
pleadings to be amended at any stage of the proceed-
ings, even after issue has been joined and the case 
set for trial, and, in a proper case, even after 
verdict or trial." 
71 Corpus Juris Secundum, black letter summary, Pleadings, Sec-
tion 282 a., p. 598. 
This is the rule in Utah, and particularly where the motion 
to amend comes before the trial. Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 
Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936), cited in 71 C.J.S. at p. 598; 
Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah2d 165, 168, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
The time when a motion to amend is filed does not in any 
way affect the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the motion. 
Moore's Federal Practice, Section 15.08, p. 901, citing: Fli-
Fab, Inc. v. United States (D Rl 1954) 16 FRD 553, 556, 21 FR 
Serv 15a. 21, Case 1; Standard Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Electrical 
Insulation, Inc. (WD Pa 1961) 29 FRD 185 (mere delay is not 
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reason enough to bar amendment where no prejudice is shown); 
Adams v. Beland Realty Corp., (FD NY 1960) 187 F.Supp. 680, 3 
FR Serv2d 15a.32, Case 5 (same); Bowles v. American Brewery, 
Inc. (D MD 1945) 8 FR Serv 15a.21, Case 13 (same); Armstrong 
Cork Co. v. Patterson-Sargent Co. (ND Ohio 1950) 10 FRD 534, 14 
FR Serv 15a.212, Case 1; Lloyd v. United Liquors Corp. (CA 6th, 
1953) 203 F.2d 789, 18 FR Serv 15a.24, Case 3; Maschmeijer v. 
Ingram (SD NY 1951) 97 F.Supp. 639, 15 FR Serv 12f.26, Case 4. 
POINT 2. 
IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE LOWER COURT TO 
REFUSE LEAVE TO AMEND WHERE NO PREJUDICE WAS CAUSED 
71 Corpus Juris Secundum states the general rule at Section 
281 b. (black letter summary): 
"In determining whether to permit an amendment of a 
pleading, the court will exercise its discretion li-
berally in furtherance of justice, where no preju-
dice or surprise to the adverse party will result . 
• • 
Also see 49 C.J., Pleading, Section 600(c), p. 475. 
Lack of a showing of prejudice has been identified many 
times by the Utah Supreme Court as a basis for reversing the 
lower court for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 
89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1936), ("No prejudice is al-
leged or shown"); Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah2d 175, 
264 P.2d 279, 280 (1953), (quoting Justice Crockett in Morns v. 
Russell, 236 P.2d 451, 455, "or in any way prejudiced"); Thomas 
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Peck 6c Sons v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah2d 187, 193 
(1973), ("no prejudice in this case"); Gillman v. Hansen, 26 
Utah2d 165, 167, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971), (little adverse effect). 
"Recognizing that the entire spirit of the rules is 
to the effect that controversies shall be decided 
on the merits, the courts have not been hesitant to 
allow amendments for the purpose of presenting the 
real issues of the case, where the moving party has 
not been guilty of bad faith and is not acting for 
thp purpose of delay, the opposing party will not 
be unduly prejudiced, and the trial of the issues 
will not be unduly delayed." 
Moore!s Federal Practice, Section 15.08, p. 875. 
Neither prejudice nor any of these elements was shown by 
the defendants to be existent in the plaintiff's motion to amend. 
Also see "Timeliness of Amendments to Pleadings Made by 
Leave of Court Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)", 
4 A.L.R. Fed. 123 (1970), which states: 
"Motions to amend pleadings made before trial have 
been granted in the exercise of the court's discre-
tion under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure upon a satisfactory showing that the mo-
vant was not guilty of bad faith nor was he acting 
for purposes of delay, that the opposing party would 
not be unduly prejudiced, and that the trial of the 
issues would not be unduly postponed." (p. 132) 
The article goes on to point out the critical nature of the ele-
ment of prejudice saying: 
"The absence of prejudice or injustice to the oppos-
ing party is the reason most frequently emphasized 
by courts in granting, over an objection, that it 
was not timely, a motion to amend before trial." 
~~" (p. 133) 
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The article cites twelve cases nationwide along with the elapsed 
time between service d£ the pleading sought to be amended and 
the actual motion to amend. The average elapsed time of those 
twelve cases comes to twenty months, over twice as long as the 
case at bar. 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFF'S DELAY IN SEEKING LEAVE TO AMEND WAS 
EXCUSABLE. 
Belated motions to amend pleadings before trial under Rule 
15(a) are allowed where the delay is excused by a showing of 
extenuating circumstances. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 123 (1970) at page 
136, citing;Wittmayer v. United States (1941 CA 9 Mont) 118 F.2d 
808; Schwab v. Nathan (1948, DC NY 8 FRD 228); System Federation 
No. 152, Railway Employees Dept. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1967 DC 
NY) 272 F.Supp. 971; Spicer v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1961, DC 
Pa) 196 F.Supp. 679; and Fli-Fab, Inc. v. United States (1954, 
DC RI) 16 FRD 553. 
Plaintiff, in the case at bar, left the State of Utah. Her 
counsel had difficulty in locating her for nine months. His ef-
forts at trying to locate her, including an ad in a newspaper, 
indicate his good faith and diligence. Plaintiff should not be 
penalized for the procedural viscissitudes of the system and 
barred forever from recovery. See Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah2d 
165, 168. 
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POINT 4. 
THE PREVAILING RULE IS TO GRANT LEAVE TO AMEND FREE-
LY TO FURTHER JUSTICE. 
The prevailing rule of law throughout American jurisdic-
tions is toward great liberality in the allowance of amendments 
to the end that the cause may be decided on its merits and 
every man receive his day in court. 49 C.J, Pleading, Section 
582, p. 466; 71 C.J.S. Pleading, Section 275 b. (black letter 
summary) p. 580; Moored Federal Practice, Section 15.08, p. 873; 
Foman v. Davis (reaffirming the mandate of Rule 15(a), 371 U.S. 
178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.ed2d 222 (1962); Am.Jur., Pleading (1st 
Ed. Section 292); "Timeliness of Amendments to Pleadings Made 
By Leave of Court Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)", 
4 A.L.R. Fed. 123, 131 (1970). 
The Utah case law has always been in accord with this impor-
tant principle. As recently as 1973 this court said in a unani-
mous opinion in regards to the lower court allowing an amend-
ment : 
"Some tempest has been raised about the court allow-
ing the plaintiff to make tardy amendments to the 
pleadings. In doing so he (lower court judge) wise-
. ly and properly stated: 'The pleadings are npver 
more important than the cause that is before the 
court . . . . There can be no prejudice in this 
case because we'll give ample time for an answer . . 
. .
f
 This is in harmony with what we regard as the 
correct policy: of recognizing the desirability of 
the pleadings setting forth definitely framed is-
sues, but also of permitting amendment where the in-
terest of justice so requires . . . " 
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Thomas Peck & Sons v. Lee Rock Products, 30 Utah2d 187, 193 
(1973). . . . . . . 
Well could the court say to the case at bar, as it said in 
Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah2d 165, 167, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971): 
11
 If ever there was a case where justice would require an amend-
ment, this case seems to be one.11 
The discretion of the lower court is subject to being exer-
cised: 
11
. . . in the furtherance of justice and must not 
be exercised so as to defeat justice. The rule in 
this state has always been to allow amendments 
freely where justice requires, and especially is 
this true before trial.11 
Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah2d 165, 168 (1971), citing Johnson v. 
Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936), where the court 
quoted the rule in 49 C.J. 466. Also see Bonneville Lumber Co. 
v. J. G. Peppard Seed Co., 72 Utah 463, 271 P. 226 (1928). 
Plaintiff had over twenty different rights breached and 
disregarded by the defendants before being returned to freedom 
after twenty-two days behind locked doors. To refuse her the 
right to have at least the opportunity to state a good complaint 
for those wrongs,when allowing the amendment causes no prejudice 
to the defendants,and before a trial, is manifest injustice. 
Plaintiff deserves her day in court on the merits, and the lower 
court's refusal to give her that is abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion 
to amend. Allowing amendment of the complaint would have been 
proper. There was no record of any prejudice to the defendants 
if thevamendment would have been granted. Plaintiff's delay in 
requesting an amendment was not unreasonable and was excusable. 
The long settled rule in Utah is to allow leave to amend freely 
in thp furtherance of justice, especially before trial. The 
denial by the lower court of leave to amend totally defeated 
plaintiff's rights to trial on thp merits, her day in court, and 
was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
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